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I. PROBLEM.

To prepare CIA plans in support of PSB J-19/d and D-7/c.

II. DISCUSSION.

1. PSB Plans noted above deal ~~entirely~~ with the Korean negotiations in a general manner. They do not reflect the numbers of contingency situations which surround the negotiations. Broadly speaking, the reasoning which lies behind the PSB plans follows this pattern:

- a. Negotiations are in progress.
- b. They will be resolved successfully or unsuccessfully.
- c. If they are successful, an armistice or cease-fire will result.

- d. If they are unsuccessful, negotiations will be broken off and full-scale hostilities will be resumed.

- e. A case study of the latest available intelligence estimates, the Korean situation as it has developed during the past six months, and the operational difficulties attendant upon contingency planning, lead to a few inevitable conclusions and point up one or two short-comings in our previous thinking.

2. In considering ~~drawing up~~ new plans, a fact of over-riding importance must be stressed. A psychological plan cannot exist in a vacuum,--it must be related to the situation, operations, capabilities, existing policy and action plans, enemy intentions, and capabilities. ~~Furthermore,~~ The number of possible contingencies which may result from

the present armistice negotiations cannot be each planned for in specific operational detail.

Planning for these contingencies must be done within the framework of our existing and projected capabilities. Important ~~on~~going operations will continue, and no major addition to our capabilities is expected to supplement the actions called for in our planning. The actions, therefore, will be such as can be carried out by the existing machinery. This will require that each major project underway in the area be informed of contingency planning and instructed to take necessary action in the event any of the contingencies evolves.

*Elaborate*

4. It is evident that a certain amount of operational action is required now to lay the ~~psychological~~ psychological groundwork in connection with the ~~armistice~~ negotiations. We cannot expect to make a plan which intends to exploit a break-off in negotiations unless certain actions are laid on in advance so that the break-off can receive maximum exploitation in the event it takes place. Psychological themes for immediate use will be worked out in the field in preparation for the contingencies. One aspect heretofore overlooked should be noted. In the event of an official (de jure) armistice we must anticipate that the Theater Commander under international law will be obliged to respect the conditions of the armistice. We must also expect that these conditions will preclude the Theater Commander from assuming any official responsibility for covert activities during the armistice period. We anticipate also that in such an armistice situation, official UN or approved neutral nation supervision will be in force.

III. CONCLUSIONS.

CIA will draw up two basic plans:

Plan 1: This plan will prepare to exploit a de jure or de facto armistice or cease-fire.

Plan 2: This plan will prepare to exploit a break-off in negotiations (whether the break-off be temporary, indefinite, or permanent). ~~The/several/possible/contingencies/which/could~~

The several contingencies which could evolve under either situation will be dealt with in subsections of the two broad plans.